Against the Ontological Argument (Updated 3/7/10)

“I began to ask myself whether there might be found a single argument which would require no other for its proof than itself alone; and alone would suffice to demonstrate that God truly exists.”

Anselm of Canterbury’s 11th Century quest for a self-contained, self-sufficient argument for the existence of God led ultimately to what today is called the Ontological Argument, one of the most hotly-debated arguments among the many which aspire to prove God’s existence. An elegantly simple argument, it grounds itself in the very being of God, as its name suggests.

The Ontological Argument begins with a definition. “God” is a term with a particular meaning, whether or not one happens to believe a God actually exists. As a concept, “God” means “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived,” as Anselm writes in Proslogium. Even the atheist understands the term “God” as referring to a being of maximal excellence, such that nothing greater could possibly exist.

And yet, the atheist contradicts himself unawares, argues Anselm. For a being which is actual is greater than an otherwise-identical being which does not exist. Thus, if God does not exist, then it is possible to conceive a being [an actual God] which is greater than that than which nothing greater can be conceived. This creates a contradiction, which is impossible; ergo, God exists.

Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

We could restate the argument, reworded for convenience’s sake, as follows:

1. “God” means “a being of maximal excellence.”

2. Existence of a being of maximal excellence is possible.

3. A being which actually exists is more excellent than a nonexistent being.

Kant famously challenged Anselm on this point, but if we are careful with our definitions this premise is actually true by definition. The argument becomes circular if we define “maximal excellence” in terms of what is best, because to declare something best one must possess a standard by which to judge. I can speak of the best car, or student, or man, because I have ideals of automotive, academic, and moral excellence, respectively. In the absence of a standard, comparison cannot yield judgment. The diligent student and the slacker are different, but without a standard (“Diligence is good”), saying one is better than the other is simply absurd. This is why a mixed-race society need not engender racism. So long as there is no idea of racial superiority (“Being white is better”), racial differences are no more significant than the color of one’s hair.

Returning to the question of “maximal excellence,” it seems we need a standard by which to declare existence a good (excellent) thing. As a Christian, I can meaningfully say that existence is good because God exists. (Just as love is good because God loves, and wisdom good because God is wise.) It is better to exist than not to exist because to exist is to be more like God, the standard from which existence draws its value.

However, within the context of the Ontological Argument existence cannot be declared excellent on those grounds, for doing so assumes the existence of God, which renders the argument circular. Yet, in the absence of God, what other standard can an atheistic universe offer? Why, in fact, is it better to exist than not to exist? This thing, A, exists; that thing, B, does not. Difference, yes. But is one better than the other? From what source could existence draw value in a reality that can only offer comparison without judgment?

Fortunately for the argument, this problem can be solved through a clarification of the meaning of “maximal excellence.” If we define maximal excellence ontologically, as the fullest possible possession of all positive attributes (i.e. maximal being), no judgment is necessary. “Best” requires judgment; “most,” mere comparison. If a being’s degree of excellence is simply its degree of being, then the proposition that maximal excellence includes existence becomes an analytic proposition that is true by definition, because its predicate (existence) is contained within its subject (maximal excellence).

4. If that being which is maximally excellent does not exist, then it would be possible for a being more excellent than that which is maximally excellent to exist. (If P, then Q)

5. Existence of a being more excellent than the maximally excellent being is contradictory and therefore impossible. (Not-Q)

6. Therefore, that being which is maximally excellent cannot not exist; i.e. God must exist. (Not-P)

I offered the succeeding elements of the argument so it could be observed it in its totality, but let us now return to (4). Putting aside the premise as a whole for the moment, consider the antecedent: “If that being which is maximally excellent does not exist…”

Now, if the analysis offered earlier is correct, a being which is maximally excellent, as defined in this argument, must exist. The proposition is either necessarily true or unprovable. But this means the antecedent “If that being which is maximally excellent does not exist…” is impossible. (Note that a return to Anselm’s precise wording, “If that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone,” does nothing to remove the impossibility.)

An impossible antecedent in a counterfactual conditional such as (4) renders the consequent vacuous; empty. Premise (5) cannot deny the consequent “then it would be possible for a being more excellent than that which is maximally excellent to exist” because there is nothing to deny. The law of noncontradiction is first of all a law of being; what cannot possibly be cannot be contradictory.

In the language of possible worlds, there is no possible world in which “that being which is maximally excellent does not exist,” and therefore no possible world in which “it would be possible for a being more excellent than that which is maximally excellent to exist.” There is therefore no possible world in which the contradiction proposed in (5), upon which the argument depends, might arise. And without the denial of (4)’s consequent in (5), the conclusion (6) is invalid.

The basic problem is that, if one assumes a maximally excellent being that does not exist, it is not a maximally excellent being, and therefore cannot generate the contradiction which Anslem is seeking. He attempts to avoid this dilemma by speaking of that than which nothing greater can be conceived existing “in the understanding alone,” as compared with existing in reality. However, what Anselm identifies “in the understanding” is not that than which nothing greater can be conceived, but the idea of that than which nothing greater can be conceived.

The idea of a thing, and the thing itself, are distinct and different. The fact that the idea of a maximally excellent being may (in fact must) exist only in the understanding does nothing to refute the fact that, by definition, a maximally excellent being that does not actually exist is not a maximally excellent being.

Once the confusion created by conflating an idea with its object is removed, as it is in (4), (5), and (6) above, Anselm’s version of the Ontological Argument fails because it cannot yield the contradiction upon which it depends.

The argument revised, but still flawed

This does not yet fully refute the Ontological Argument, though. We still have this necessary analytical truth: A being of maximal excellence must exist. Taken by itself, this proposition forms the basis for the Cartesian version of the Ontological Argument. In Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes writes,

But, nevertheless, when I think of it more attentively, it appears that the existence can no more be separated from the essence of God, than the idea of a mountain from that of a valley, or the equality of its three angles to two right angles, from the essence of a rectilinear triangle; so that it is not less impossible to conceive a God, that is, a being supremely perfect, to whom existence is wanting, or who is devoid of a certain perfection, than to conceive a mountain without a valley.

Descartes observes further, “the mountain or valley, whether they do or do not exist, are inseparable from each other.” Likewise, “because I cannot conceive God unless as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from him, and therefore that he really exists.”

In making a response it is important to start, as before, with careful definition. If by, “A being of maximal excellent must exist” we mean, “A being of maximal excellence actually does necessarily exist,” then we have our conclusion: God exists. For “God” is merely the name given the concept “a being of maximal excellence.”

However, this cannot be the true meaning of the proposition, “A being of maximal excellent must exist.” What is actually meant is, “If a being possesses maximal excellence, it must necessarily exist.” Which of course does nothing to prove God’s existence, though it does prove that an existent God would possess necessary rather than contingent being.

Maximal excellence is itself a predicate: we say that some substance or other possesses maximal excellence. The proposition, “A being of maximal excellence must exist” further predicates necessary existence of a being of maximal excellence. In other words, if a being possesses maximal excellence, then it will possess necessary being.

When Descartes says it is “impossible to conceive a God, that is, a being supremely perfect, to whom existence is wanting,” he is correctly observing that a being of maximal excellence would exist necessarily. However, the necessary existence is a condition of the maximal excellence, and cannot be predicated of the being itself unless maximal excellence can also be predicated. Descartes’ argument could be restated as follows:

1. If a being possesses maximal excellence, then it will necessarily exist.

2. God is a being possessing maximal excellence.

Again we must distinguish between idea and object. This premise cannot mean, “Our idea of God is that of a being possessing maximal excellence,” because that would in no way support the conclusion that follows.

3. Therefore, God necessarily exists.

If the conclusion (3) is to be true, both premises must be true. However, Descartes’ only evidence in support of (2) is his own conception of God. He has an idea of God as a being possessing maximal excellence; or, expressed differently, we call our idea of a being possessing maximal excellence “God.” The fact that Descartes (and I, and every man) has an idea of a being possessing maximal excellence does not itself prove the existence of that being, any more than the idea of a horse with a horn proves the existence of unicorns. Neither is it possible to offer (1) to prove (2), because (1) offers not one iota of evidence that some specific being – God – in fact possesses the maximal excellence which would entail necessary existence.

It is true that one might attempt to refine the argument by avoiding the specificity of “God”:

1. If a being possesses maximal excellence, then it will necessarily exist.

2. Existence of a being of maximal excellence is possible.

Unfortunately, this only yields the obvious and useless conclusion that existence of a necessarily existent being is possible. We already know God might exist, the question is whether he in fact does; and it seems the Ontological Argument cannot offer proof on that point.

There are many good reasons to believe in the existence of God. And the reasoning of the Ontological Argument does prove that once his existence as a maximally excellent being is assumed, we can be assured that he does exist necessarily. However, reasoning in the other direction, from maximal excellence to actual existence, appears to run into impassible difficulties, no matter which road we take.

[Note: This post is a significant revision of my original article, first published on March 3. My initial argument rested solely on the reasoning regarding judgment and comparison which I developed in my response to (3) of Anselm’s argument. Further reflection suggested that alone was a woefully inadequate counterargument, which precipitated the further thoughts outlined in this revised post. (3/7/10)]